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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 960005-CA

vs.
Category No. 2
CLARK ROY FRIESEN,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State has appealed from an Order of Dismissal in a prosecution for Possession
of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996), following the granting of Appellee's Motion to Suppress
Evidence.
The appeal is not properly before this court for two reasons. First, the Order of
Dismissal of the Information in this case did not state that the dismissal was with prejudice
as required by State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). Second, the trial Court did not
certify that the evidence suppressed substantially impaired the prosecution's case as required
by the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Troyer.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Does the State have the right to appeal where the order of dismissal does not
provide that the dismissal is with prejudice and the trial court has made no finding or
certification that the state's case is substantially impaired by the suppression of the evidence?
2. Is the State prohibited from raising the issue of alternative justification for the
traffic stop and detention of Defendant where the issue and argument was not raised at the
trial Court level?
3. Did the trial Court clearly err in finding that Trooper Wilson made an illegal stop
of Defendant's vehicle where the Trooper did not know in fact, whether or not Defendant
was violating the law of Wyoming.
The trial Court's findings of fact are subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of
review and are reviewed deferentially.

Conclusions of law are subject to review for

"correctness."
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
RULES, ETC,
IV AMENDMENT TO U.S. CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
ARTICLE IV SECTION 1 Privileges and immunities U.S. CONSTITUTION
[1] The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States.
2

4.305(5)
(5) to operate upon any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to
be registered without having the license plate or plates securely attached, and
the registration card issued by the division carried in the vehicle, except that
the registration card issued by the division to all trailers and semitrailers shall
be carried in the towing vehicle;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Deter it

Hstribute, a

Third Degree Felony. Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to a
warrantless search of his vehicle. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial Court granted

entered a dismissal without designating the dismissal to be "with prejudice" and did not make
am findings or certification that the granting of the suppression motion substantially
impaired the ability of the state to proceet ( 'ill 11 i j > 11. -. 11 1

I' 11 \ i "')

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 20, 1997, Defendant was operating a vehicle validly licensed in the state
of Wyoming.

As he proceeded northbound approaching Nephi, Utah, Utah Highway
* Wilson vs as observing traffic and noticed that Defendant's vehicle did not

have a front license plate displayed. The trooper testified that the sole reason he stopped the
vehicle with his overhead lights was that there was no front license plate displayed because
!

!

»'•

testified that

t behind the

vehicle he saw that it was a Wyoming vehicle and that he did not know whether or not failure

3

to display a Wyoming plate was a violation of Wyoming law. (75. 19-22) Trooper Wilson
stated that as he approached the rear of the vehicle he determined that the rear plate was
current. (75. 26) He testified that he thought the vehicle might be stolen because it did not
display a front plate. (R. 75. 26)
The trooper admitted that once he approached the vehicle, prior to any contact with
the driver, he saw that the vehicle had a damaged front bumper and noticed the front plate
on the dashboard. The trooper then testified that once he became aware that the vehicle in
fact had two plates, his purpose for further detention was to see if the driver had a valid
driver's license. (75. 24)
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision (a
copy the Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum A), finding that the
officer's stop on fhe basis of the out-of-state vehicle not displaying a front licence plate did
not amount to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was committing a crime since the officer
observed a Wyoming rear plate before he stopped the vehicle and only "assumed" that
Wyoming required a front plate be displayed.
The State filed a motion for reconsideration based upon a stipulation by the parties
that Wyoming does issue and require display of a front plate. The Court issued a second
Memorandum Decision (a copy of the second Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as
Addendum B). The Court determined that it did not matter whether or not Wyoming was
one of those states which required the display of a front license plate since the officer
assumed and did not know that fact at the time he stopped the motorist Defendant.
4

Upon motion by the State, the Court entered an Order of Dismissal (a copy of which
is attached hereto as Addendum C) dismissing the Information against Defendant, but not
with prejudice.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The appeal of the State from the ruling of the Court is improper since the State has
a limited right to appeal governed by the conditions set forth in State v. Troyer, 866 P. 2d
528 (Utah 1993), requiring that the trial Court certify that the suppression of evidence
substantially impairs the prosecution's case, and the dismissal is with prejudice. In the
present case, the dismissal of the Court did not state that it was with prejudice and there was
no certification orfindingby the Court that the prosecution's case was substantially impaired
by the suppression of evidence.
The State argues on appeal that although the the facts support the finding of the trial
Court that the trooper's stop based upon the lack of a front license plate on Defendant's
vehicle did not justify the stop, the Court should have considered an alternative basis for the
trooper's stop, i.e., that the vehicle may have been stolen. However, that argument was not
raised in the State's memorandum or in any argument submitted to the trial court. The State
has raised the issue for the first time in this appeal. This Court should not consider an issue
not raised during argument nor briefing at the trial Court level.
The trial Court found from the evidence that the trooper did not know that Wyoming
was one of those states which required a front hcense plate to be displayed. The Court ruled
that the trooper did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle and that
5

the stop was unjustified. "The factual findings of the trial court underlying a trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential
clearly-erroneous standard, [but] the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts."
State v. Moreno, 910 P. 2d 1245, at 1247 (Utah Ct. App.) cert. Denied, 916 P. 2d 909 (Utah
1996). The findings of the Court were not clearly erroneous and the resulting decision was
correct.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPEAL OF THE STATE IN THIS CASE IS IMPROPER SINCE
THE REQUIREMENTS OF TROYER WERE NOT MET.
The appeal of the State from the ruling of the Court is improper since the State has
a limited right to appeal governed by the conditions set forth in State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528
(Utah 1993), requiring that the trial Court certify that the suppression of evidence
substantially impairs the prosecution's case, and the dismissal is with prejudice.
In Troyer, supra, at 866 P.2d 531, the Court stated the following:
We will therefore review suppression orders on appeal from a dismissal only
where the trial court certifies that the evidence suppressed substantially
impairs the prosecution's case.
Second, as a further safeguard, we will require the State to request dismissal
with prejudice to obtain review of suppression orders on an appeal of right
from a dismissal. In other words, if the orders are not affirmed on appeal, the
State may not refile the charges.
Hereafter, trial court certification as explained above will be required
6

before the State may appeal and seek review of suppression orders after
dismissal.
In the present case, the dismissal of the Court did not state that it was with prejudice
and there was no certification or finding by the Court that the prosecution's case was
substantially impaired by the suppression of evidence. The Order of Dismissal of the Court
provided simply: "Based upon the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing therefore, the
Court hereby dismisses the above case." See also State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114 (Utah App.
1997).
The motion of the State requesting dismissal did allege that the Order of Suppression
impaired the prosecution of the case and did request the dismissal with prejudice; however,
the Order (drafted by the State) did not set forth any certification or findings addressing that
issue nor did the dismissal state it to be with prejudice. Under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, a voluntary dismissal by Plaintiff is without prejudice unless otherwise
specified in the order. See Career Service Review Bd. v. Utah Dept Of Corrections, 942
P.2d 933. The appeal should be dismissed for lack of compliance with the conditions set by
the appellate courts for a prosecution appeal.
POINT II
APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE OFFICER'S
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE VEHICLE FOR
REASONS OTHER THAN THE FAILURE TO DISPLAY A FRONT
LICENSE PLATE DURING ARGUMENT OR BRIEFING AT THE
TRIAL COURT LEVEL AND HAS THEREFORE WAIVED THAT
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
While admitting that the trial Court's finding is supported by trooper Wilson's
7

testimony, the State now argues that the Court "narrowly" focused on the trooper's
assumption that the vehicle was being operated in violation of Wyoming law while
overlooking the possibility that the trooper had other suspicion to justify the stop. The
reason the decision of the trial Court did not address this argument is that it was never raised
below. The parties briefed the issues and submitted written memoranda and argument. The
State's Memorandum is attached as Addendum B to the Appellant's brief. The factual
account in the Memorandum does not contain any reference to any other reason for stopping
the vehicle other than no front plate. The argument of the State that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle does not mention any other reason in addition to the
no front plate and argued that "Trooper Wilson pulled Defendant over because Defendant
was violating Utah law which required that vehicles registered in Wyoming must have front
plates in Utah based upon § 41-la-1305(5) and § 41-la-404"
Nor did the State raise the issue in the Motion for Reconsideration of Suppression and
to Supplement the Record. The trial Court cannot be expected to consider arguments which
are not presented to the Court and to opposing counsel.
In State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995), the appellate Court held that
arguments and issues not raised at the trial Court level could not be raised for the first time
on appeal. See also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1990). The State should not be
able to raise issues of justification for the stop which were not argued below.

8

POINT III
THE FACTUAL FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
TRAFFIC STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS UNJUSTIFIED
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CORRECT
The trial Court found from the evidence that the trooper did not know that Wyoming
was one of those states which required a front license plate to be displayed. This finding is
clearly supported by the record in this case. The trooper testified that he assumed that not
displaying a front license plate violated Wyoming's law but that he did not know. (75. 21-22)
Further, the trooper testified that the only basis for his suspicion that the vehicle might be
stolen was that there was no front plate on the vehicle. (75. 27) The totality of the record
demonstrates that the reason the vehicle was stopped was because of the failure to display
a front plate. There was nothing other than that fact upon which the trooper based any
suspicion that the vehicle may have be a stolen vehicle. In addition, the trooper testified that
he drove up past the vehicle and saw that the front bumper and grill had been damaged in the
area where the front license plate would be displayed. (75. 5) Then as he approached the
vehicle, he observed the front plate on the dashboard. (75. 5, 25)
Further, the position of the trooper was that even though he was aware that there are
states which do not require the display of a front plate, he considered it within his authority
to stop any vehicle not complying with Utah registration requirements. (R.75 22-23)
In State v. Tetmey, 947 P.2d 1157 (1997), the appellate Court found the officer's stop
of a vehicle based upon the officer's observations of the driver and his passenger which led
the officer to conclude the driver may have been driving impaired. The Court found that an
9

innocent explanation could easily be given for each of the observations of the officer upon
which he based his suspicion. At 947 P.2d 1160, the Court observed:
We hold that, taken together, these four articulated circumstances do not
provide reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while under the
influence. Instead, these circumstances "describe a very large category of
presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random
seizures were [we] to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this
case could justify a seizure." Reidv. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct.
2752, 2754, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980).
A Utah case which has more than passing similarities to the present case is that of State v.
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Ct. App. 1988). In Baird, Trooper Mangelson of the Utah Highway
Patrol, stopped an Arizona vehicle which was northbound in the area of Nephi, Utah,
because the sticker on the rear hcense plate did not appear to be valid. Although the trooper
admitted he was unaware of the Arizona color scheme for stickers, he followed the car to
determine if the year was valid. After stopping the car, the trooper determined that the year
was in fact valid. After stopping the vehicle and determining that the plate was current, the
trooper made other observations which the State attempted to use to justify the stop such as
the vehicle had new tire and shocks, a twisted off gas cap, a jack in the back seat, the
defendant's confusion about ownership, and the smell of marijuana. The appellate Court
rejected this reasoning, stating:
While this may have justified a further inquiry of the driver after a valid stop,
such articulable suspicion must be present at the time of the stop and must be
the reason for the stop. In this case, no reasonable or articulable suspicion
existed to justify the stop. The evidence used to convict defendant was
derived by exploitation of the impermissible stop. 763 P.2d at 1217.
Of particular interest is footnote 1 to the decision concerning to the reason for the
10

stop. Footnote 1 observes: "If this is sufficient reason to stop, every out-of-state vehicle may
be stopped for no other reason other than the officer's ignorance of the license plate sticker
color code." 763 P.2d at 1217.
The same observation applies to the present case. If not displaying a front license
plate is sufficient cause to stop an out-of-state vehicle, then any such vehicle may be stopped
for no other reason than the officer's ignorance of the vehicle registration requirements of
the state in which the vehicle is registered. Under a totality of the circumstances analysis,
the trooper's concern became substantially diluted once he saw the damaged area on the front
bumper and grill since there would be an obviously innocent explanation of the reason there
was no front plate. Further, when, as the trooper approached the vehicle, he saw the front
plate on the dashboard, that fact would further dilute any suspicion that the officer might
otherwise have based upon the failure to display a front plate.
The Court ruled that the trooper did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop
the vehicle and that the stop was unjustified. "The factual findings of the trial court
underlying a trial courts decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed
under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, [but] the legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal
standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P. 2d 1245, at 1247 (Utah Ct. App.) cert
Denied, 916 P. 2d 909 (Utah 1996). The record clearly supports the ruling of the trial Court.
CONCLUSION
The appeal of the State should be dismissed for failure to meet the requirements of
11

Troyer. The argument of the State concerning alternative basis to justify the traffic stop and
detention of Defendant cannot be considered as that argument and issue was not raised
below. The factual findings of the trial Court determining that the stop for no front license
plate to be unjustified is supported by the facts and admitted by the State in its brief. The
ruling of the trial Court suppressing the evidence should be upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of March, 1999.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
~^
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 15th day of March, 1999, two
copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellee to the following:
Marian Decker
Assistant Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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IV AMENDMENT TO U.S. CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
ARTICLE IV SECTION 1 Privileges and immunities U.S. CONSTITUTION
[1] The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States.
U.C.A. § 41-la-1305(5)
(5) to operate upon any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to
be registered without having the license plate or plates securely attached, and
the registration card issued by the division carried in the vehicle, except that
the registration card issued by the division to all trailers and semitrailers shall
be carried in the towing vehicle;

41-la-404

MOTOR VEHICLES-

611

shall notify the division «and surrender the registration
card and license plate of the withdrawn vehicle.
(11) (a) An out-of-state carrier with an apportionally registered vehicle who has not presented a certificate of
property tax or in lieu fee as required by Section 41-la206 or 41-la-207, shall pay, at the time of registration, a
proportional part of an equalized highway use tax computed as follows:
(i) Multiply the number of vehicles or combination
vehicles registered in each weight class by the
equivalent tax figure from the following tables:
Vehicle or
Combination
Registered
Weight
12,000 pounds
or less
12,000 pounds
or less
12,000 pounds
or less
12,000 pounds
f or less
12,000 pounds
« or leas

Age of Vehicle

Equivalent
Tax

12 or more years

$10

9 or more years but
less than 12 years
6 or more years but
less than 9 years
3 or more years but
less than 6 years
, Less than 3 years

$50

„ Vehicle" or 'Combination
* * *-T> *»'• 1*'*" JTTT • 1.A

r I^gwteredTVeight.
12,001-^-18,000
pounds
i8,0dV—34,000 pounds
,534,001 ^ 4 ^ , 0 0 0 pounds
'48,001 ^ 6 ^ 0 0 0 po'unds
64,001 .pounds and over

v

$80
$110
$150
Equivalent
Tax
$150
200
300
450
600

<M

(ii) Multiply the equivalent tax value for the total
fleet/determined under Subsection (HXaXi) by the
^fraction Computed under Subsection (3) for the apportioned fleet "for the registration year. - i 3 i '
(b)' Fees shall he assessed as provided in Section 41-la1207i ji *'* rv ?)*«^ -*'{
**ic
«*:*«...»,
r
(12) (a) ^ m m e r c i a l vehicles meeting the registration requirements of another jurisdiction may, as an alternative
•to rfull*6r ^portioned registration,'secure a temporary
registration permit for a period not to exceed 96 hours or
until the^rieaVe the state, whichever is less, for a fee of
$20 for a single unit and $40 for multiple units. b
(b) A state temporary permit or registration fee is not
required from nonresident owners or operators of vehicles
or combination of vehicles having a gross laden weight of
•26,000 pounds' or less for each single unit or combination.
1998

41-la-302^-RepealeoV

1996

(2) The division may receive applications for registration
renewal, renew registration, and issue new license plates or
decals at any time prior to the expiration of registration.
(3) (a) All Ucense plates to be manufactured and issued by
the division shall be treated with a fully reflective material on the plate face that provides effective and dependable reflective brightness during the service period of the
license plate.
(b) The division shall prescribe all license plate material specifications and establish and implement procedures for conforming to the specifications
(c) The specifications for the materials used such as the
aluminum plate substrate, the reflective sheeting, and
glue shall be drawn in a manner so that at least two
manufacturers may qualify as suppliers
(d) The granting of contracts for the materials shall be
by public bid.
(4) (a) The commission may issue, adopt, and require the
use of indicia of registration it considers advisable in lieu
of or in conjunction with license plates as provided in this
part
(b) All provisions of this part relative to license plates
apply to these indicia of registration, so far as the provisions are applicable.
1992
41-la-402. Required colors, numerals, a n d letters —
Expiration.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), each license plate
shall be-in colors selected by the commission and shall have
displayed on it: (a) the registration number assigned to the vehicle for
which it is issued; } - r
, • Xb) the name of the state;
(c) a designation of the county in which the vehicle is
registered as provided in Section 41-la-406;
(d) the date of expiration; and
(e) a slogan determined as provided in Section 41-la(2) If registration i s extended by affixing a validation decal
to the license, plate, the expiration date of the decal governs
the expiration date of the license plate.
^ **• t,
(3) beginning July 1,1997;, .each original license plate that
is not one of (the,apecial group license plates issued under
Section 41-la-408.§hall t e j ^ "t ,J
' \
\ *\'* '\v\ J
(a) statehood ^centennial license plate with the same
color,'design, and slogan as the plates issued in conjunction with the statehood centennial; or J / * '!'*'
* (b) Ski Utah license plate.
'
f
1997
41-la-403. Plates to' be legible from 100 feet. •>
'License plates and the required letters and numerals on
them, except the decals and the slogan, shall be of sufficient
size to be plainly readable from a distance of 100 feet during
daylight.

*j >***'ii \

- -«L*I *

*l

- . ""^

•«i«K*w 1992
*/>' f'

41-la-404, -Location a n d position of plates. ^ , ;r.
(1) License plates issued for a vehicle, otherjthan a motorcycle, trailer, or semitrailer shall be attached to the vehicle,
LICENSE PLATES AND REGISTRATION INDICIA
one in the front and the other in the rear.
41-la-401. -: License • plates — • N u m b e r . of plates — (2) The license plate issued for a motorcycle, trailer, or
Reflectorization — I n d i c i a of registration i n semitrailer shall be attached to the rear of the motorcycle,
w *B^ .,5*5 lieu of o r used,with plates.
^
trailer, or semitrailer. «•
}\. t - ^ ^ . , , 1 , . t 0 ) r
(1) (a) The division upon registering a vehicle shall issue to
: ,<3) Every license plate shall at alljtimes be:«, . > l(i
the owner-one license plate ifor a motorcycle, trailer, or i> biJa) securely fastened:-;^o, y>j „** wn.f-rrr; ;}
i^-jtHBemitrailerjejid two identical license plates for-every other - ..r Mrt! *v iii) i n a horizontal position to the vehicle for which
r » ?rr» * i t is issued io prevent ^the plate from swinging; r «-.
vehicle. &£&n *• , t*c o>- +r * . t, . m<st*z*j,
ssre if I (b)oilhe license, plate shall be issued for^the particular 7o.*£ttnoifii0i)>*t a height of^not less thantl2Jnches from the
vehicle v registered and inay^not >be, removed during the &s/o*« 3 J groundVmeasuring from theJbottom^£the>plate; and
d W term fo*<which4he license plate is issued or used upon any v - - _ , n« 4,w)ipn a place and position tfi^e clearjyyjsible; and
-' othertfehiclejthan -the. registered.vehicle^ c & a*j
(b) maintained:>
Hawqcino w tn*aux$irx&
PART 4 '

(i) free from foreign materials; and
OiHn a condition to be clearly legible.
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OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages
in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d t h a t is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing
series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions t h a t are undertaken in concert with
five or more persons with respect to whom the
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa)
with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a
controlled substance analog is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony, i
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule HI or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
QXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
' seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence-may not be suspended, and the
' person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
this subsection; * - > ^ _ ,
- »«•. v , « . *.
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or - <
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance.
r
(b) Any person convicted >t)f violating. Subsection
(2XaXi) with respect to: wim
*tU< v * r - . . J.
J' <i). marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
4s guilty of a second degree felony; i <>VJ >
' (ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less
.than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is
guilty of a third degree felony; or
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(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
the amount is more t h a n one ounce but less t h a n 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2XaXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person, t h a t person
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with
respect to all other controlled substances not included in
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less t h a n one
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction
the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2XaXU) or (2Xa)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
>(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-tionally:
Ai) to use in the course of the manufacture or
distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
- prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to ^uiy person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription orwritten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
,s
false name or address;
> (iii) to make any'false or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, 'or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any
1
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance, -vu,
nvq J
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection t3Xa)
is guilty of a third degree felony. * *n \ ^J - zirl 't
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:<>•' J t - ' i f i f f i r*jirl
7- (a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section} a
person not authorized under this chapter-*who!commits
any act declared to be unlawful under this section,-Title
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act,Tor under
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

R u l e 39. Trial b y j u r y o r b y t h e court.
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the
register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so
demanded shall be by jury, unless
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written
stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made
in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the
court sitting without a jury, or
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that
a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not
exist, or
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any
or all issues.
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter
of right.
R u l e 40. A s s i g n m e n t of c a s e s for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide
by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1)
without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also
require the, party seeking the continuance to state, upon
affidavit or under, oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and
if the adverse party thereupon admits t h a t such evidence
would be given, and t h a t it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the
trial shall not be postponed upon t h a t ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the
adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present
taken, in the same m a n n e r as if a t t h e trial; and the testimony
so taken may be read on t h e trial with the same effect, a n d
subject to the same objections t h a t m a y be made with respect
to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2)
[Rule 32(c)(3XA) and (B)].

Rule 42

court of t h e United States or of any state an action based on or
including the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a
notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
this rule, a n action may only be dismissed a t the request of the
plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in
the action; or
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for mdependent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is
without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
move for a dismissal on the ground t h a t upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff h a s shown no right to relief. The court as trier
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other t h a n a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits. >> v - ^ u ~* ?,
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of
Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction
of evidence a t the trial or hearing. f\
u~> * .
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed
action. If a plaintiff who
h a s once dismissed a n action in any court commences a n
action based upon or including the same claim-against the
same defendant, the court may make such order for the
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may
deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until
the plaintiff has complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party.
Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (aXIXi)
above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party,
t h e bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional
remedy m u s t thereupon be delivered by the court'to the
adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was
obtained.

R u l e 41. D i s m i s s a l of a c t i o n s .
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of
Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice,' except t h a t a
notice'of dismissal operates a s . a n adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who h a s once dismissed in any

Rule 42. Consolidation; s e p a r a t e trials.
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
• (b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim,.or of.any

ADDENDUM A
MEMORANDUM DECISION (June 2, 1998)

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 971400205
DATE: June 2,1998

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

CLARK ROY FRJJESEN,

LAW CLERK: David Sturgill
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having
received and considered the Motion and a supporting memorandum, the Court hereby grants the
Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
On or about October 20,1997, UHP officer Charlie Wilson observed Defendant
traveling northbound on 1-15. The officer noticed Defendant's vehicle did not have afrontlicense
plate, and decided to pull Defendant over. Before the officer signaled to Defendant to stop, he
observed a Wyoming license plate displayed on the rear bumper of Defendant's vehicle.
The officer testified at the preliminary hearing that the only reason he stopped
Defendant was because of the missingfrontplate. He testified that he knew some states did not
require a front license plate, but was not sure of the Wyoming requirement. The officer testified
that he "assumed" Wyoming required two license plates since he had seen other Wyoming cars
display both front and rear plates.
The officer made contact with Defendant and was provided a valid driver's license and
vehicle registration. At that point, the officer testified that he detected the odor of marijuana.
The officer asked Defendant for consent to search his vehicle, to which Defendant reluctantly
responded "if you have to." The search eventually produced a 12 pound bag of marijuana.

Opinion of the Court
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: Mthe right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated [.]M U.S. CONST, amend IV; see also UTAH CONST, art. I, §
12. The concern of the Fourth Amendment is against "unreasonable" or unjustified searches and
seizures—"reasonable" searches and seizures are constitutionally valid. Although the expectation
of privacy in a vehicle is less than that of a home, "one does not lose the protection of the Fourth
Amendment while in an automobile." State v. SchlosserT 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989).
In Utah, a peace officer may stop and question a person, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is,
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994)
{quoting United States v. Flaw, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983)).
In this case, Officer Wilson testified at the preliminary hearing that the only reason he
stopped Defendant was because of the missing front license plate. He admitted that he wasn't
sure whether vehicles registered in Wyoming were required to display front plates. He "assumed"
they were because he had observed other Wyoming vehicles with front plates. The officer's
"assumption" does not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal
activity. A number of lawful reasons could have existed to explain the absence of a front plateone being that Wyoming law does not require them.
The State cites Utah Code Annotated § 41-1A-1305. That section provides that it is a
Class "C" Misdemeanor for any person to "operate on any highway of this state any vehicle
required by law to be registered without having license plates or plate securely attached." The
State argues that the statute does not exempt vehicles licensed in other jurisdictions. Assuming
the State's interpretation of the statute is correct, that does not cure the officer's "assumption" of
Wyoming's license plate requirement. The officer noticed Defendant's vehicle was registered in
Wyoming before he pulled him over. At that time, the officer did not know whether Wyoming
vehicles were required to display both front and rear license plates. Clearly, the officer cannot
enforce a law that he merely "assumed" existed. Officer Wilson should have discontinued his
pursuit of Defendant and allowed him to proceed without interruption.
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The State claims "[cjlearly the faint smell of marijuana givesriseto a reasonable
suspicion that there was marijuana in the car[.]" While this may have justified a further inquiry of
the driver after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must be present at the time of the stop and
must be the reason for the stop. In this case, no reasonable or articulable suspicion existed to
justify the stop. Furthermore, the unjustified stop negates any subsequent consent to search
Defendant's vehicle.
The bag of marijuana discovered in Defendant's vehicle was derived by exploitation of
an impermissible stop. Because none of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply, the
evidence will be suppressed.
Order
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted.
DATED this ^

cc:

day of June, 1998.

David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney
Michael D. Espiin, Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM B
MEMORANDUM DECISION (August 18, 1998)

r-?*r
'•-•^HirifD £ij3 2^1998
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
PlaintuT,

CASE NO. 971400205
DATE: August 18, 1998

vs.

JUDGE: RAYM. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

CLARK ROY FRIESEN,

LAW CLERK: DaveBackman
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of
Suppression and to Supplement the Record. The Court sees no reason to reconsider the decision
to suppress evidence. Mr. Esplin's stipulation that Wyoming law requires afrontlicense plate has
no bearing on the Court's decision since it does not change the fact that the oflBcer assumed and
did not know that Wyoming requires two license plates. Having received and considered the
Motion and the stipulation, the Court hereby denies the Motion.
DATED t h i s / / day of August, 1998.

cc:

David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney
Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant

ADDENDUM C
MOTION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
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David O. Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
**

JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 971400205

CLARK ROY FRTESEN,
Defendant.
The State of Utah, through the Juab County Attorney, hereby moves the court to dismiss
the above entitled action against the defendants on the ground that the suppression order will
substantially impair the prosecution's ability to proceed in the case. See State vs. Troyer, 866
P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1993). Therefore, the State moves to dismiss the above entitled case with
prejudice.
Dated this

/ L

^

day of

I-^pliw. L - ^

l

. 1998.

(\)cj]&j~J

David O. Leavitt
Juab County Attorney
ORDER

Based on the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby
dismisses the above case.
Dated this /y7

day

oi^-J**£a£

District Judg^y^

STATE CF UTAH

)
) SS.
COUNTY CF JUAB)
:. *hz undesigned, Clerk of the* Fourth District Court
-:•; .}±zb County, Utsh, do hereby certify that the
• -.;8c-y.ec:: i-nd -orezvpz Is s true and full copy of the
•.:••-'•• Socur^m on file if? my c"t;C3 ss such Clark^
*':•?.zz-i^-i ny r^nci ?.:-d sea: o? said Ccurt this j£^fcfr\
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